The United States' experience with the Ebola virus in 2014 provides a window into US public health politics. First, the US provided a case study in the role of suasion and executive action in the management of public health in a fragmented multi--level system. The variable capacity of different parts of the US to respond to Ebola on the level of hospitals or state governments, and their different approaches, show the limitations of federal influence, the importance of knowledge and executive energy, and the diversity of both powerful actors and sources of power. Second, the politics of Ebola in the US is a case study in the politics of partisan blame attribution. The outbreak struck in the run--up to an election that was likely to be good for the Republican party, and the election dominated interest in and opinions of Ebola in both the media and public opinion. Democratic voters and media downplayed Ebola while Republican voters and media focused on the outbreak. The media was a key conduit for this strategic politicization, as shown in the quantity, timing, and framing of news about Ebola. Neither fragmentation nor partisanship appears to be going away, so understanding the politics of public health crises will remain important. 
Introduction
The United States had little to fear from Ebola. When the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa began to receive attention, American public health officials hastened to make reassuring statements, emphasizing the consensus that Ebola was transmitted primarily through intimate contact with bodily fluids of infectious victims and therefore primarily a risk to health care providers close to victims of the outbreak.
The American public was in much more danger of getting sick or dying from a more banal illness, like the flu. The focus, U.S. public health leaders suggested, should be on Ebola as a global health threat that should be addressed in Africa (Fauci 2014 ).
In retrospect, those public health officials were correct. In 2014--15, the United States had a total of eleven cases on its soil, four diagnosed in the country and seven of them evacuated from Africa after diagnosis. But at the same time, the political response to the Ebola outbreak in the United States was marked by a long string of news stories about incompetence and divergent government responses to the outbreak. The outbreak became a highly politicized topic which morphed into broader discussions of border security, immigration policy, and terrorism (SteelFisher, Blendon, and Lasala--Blanco 2015) .
The combination of decentralized management of the outbreak with highly partisan public debate is typical of American politics. The Ebola experience of 2014
can be viewed as a case study in the politics of public health in the United States.
Understanding the policy, and political, responses to the disease sheds light on the operation of public health, the political system, and the interaction of the two. It underlines how powerful, and patterned, political forces shape public health action.
In particular, it highlights how in a fragmented system responses tend to be driven by suasion--persuasive expertise--and executive action by presidents and governors rather than a coherent bureaucratic response.
Section One sketches the background of public health in the United States, which is a fragmented system in a fragmented country. Section Two argues that any public health action involves coordination of the federal government, state governments, public health agencies, and the American healthcare system. In each organization, there is a set of diverse actors who operate in a complex institutional landscape with no authoritative single source of regulation. The result is that action takes place through a mixture of executive initiative, forcing coordination within states or the federal government, and suasion between governments and the health system, relying on guidelines and expertise rather than hierarchical authority to shape responses.
Section Three turns from public health response to the politics that shaped policymakers' incentives and public perceptions. It argues that public opinion is affected by media outlet coverage of an event. Elites "cue" the public, especially partisans, with views about the importance and development of issues such as Ebola. We examine the role that media play in the politicization of the Ebola outbreak. We track the frequency and usage of stories related to Ebola in the six month period leading up the 2014 midterm elections on Fox News and MSNBC. We find that Fox News began covering the outbreak earlier, and produced stories more frequently than MSNBC, until immediately after the midterm elections, at which point coverage waned on the network.
Section Four then turns to the public, the audience for both media and politicians. Political scientists routinely find that blame attribution and interest in a topic are more driven by pre--existing political views in the mass public than by close attention to the management of the outbreak. Ebola interest peaked in the run--up to the 4 November 2014 midterm election, when the opposition Republicans, who controlled the House of Representatives, had incentive to pin blame on the incumbent Democrats in an effort to gain majority control of the Senate. We show that in the month before the elections, Ebola became much more salient amongst
Republican voters than Democratic voters. The politicization of the outbreak eventually involved President Obama, the federal government, and news media handling of Ebola and the beliefs about the likelihood of an outbreak striking the United States. Taken together, these themes indicate that there needs to be greater awareness of the political dynamics at play for public health officials. Too many public health practitioners, who daily work on the front lines of federal, state, and local health departments, believe that they are immune from political machinations when they are not (Oliver 2006 
I. Communicable disease control in a fragmented system
"Fragmentation" is one of the key words of American health policy studies (Okma and Marmor 2015 , White 2009 , Emanuel 2014 . The United States has a fragmented political system, with an internally divided federal government, fifty states with constitutionally granted public health powers, which are also internally divided, and tens of thousands of local governments with varying emergency management and health responsibilities and capabilities.
System
There is little dispute that the American health care system is fragmented. Providers vary in scale, from large "systems" to small doctors' practices, and their ownership can be public, private, or non--profit. Many non--profit systems, even ones carrying residual religious connections, are every bit as focused on expansion, market share and margin as for--profit companies. Gaps in the provision of health care, as of 2014, were partially being filled by the Affordable Care Act, which provided public (Medicaid) insurance in some states or subsidized private insurance to the previously uninsured in all states (White 2013 ). The result is that the capacity of providers to invest in communicable disease is variable, and there is no guarantee that they will make investments or formulate effective policies. Nor is there a single, coherent, centre of power over provider behaviour, or shared set of strategic and operational goals among providers, or even a reliable way to coordinate patient movements in a given area with public health agencies. With a disease such as Ebola, which is substantially a healthcare--acquired infection, this diversity of providers is particularly important as they are key actors in its control or propagation.
States
In the basic American federal structure, core public health powers such as the power to quarantine are part of a broader "police power" that belongs to the states, not the federal government. Federal government's coercive powers are enumerated and focused on interstate commerce and border protection (Katz and Rosenbaum 2010 (Fidler and Gostin 2008 , Lakoff and Collier 2008 , Botoseneanu et al. 2011 ).
The second, more prominent, centre of Ebola--related activity in the federal government is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Within DHHS, the centre of expertise and prestige is the CDC. CDC has been tremendously influential in public health over the decades since it began as a malaria control unit during World War Two, shaping basic public health concepts such as surveillance and carving out a connection with security agencies (Etheridge 1992 , Fearnley 2010 ).
The third, most important center, is the executive--the White House. Major issues such as Ebola are coordinated at the federal level through White House advisors and the National Security Council (the principal venue for coordination on security issues, when it is working as intended, but also one focused on international rather than domestic affairs). Departments and agencies are pulled in so many directions, by their missions, legacies, and particular constituencies that it takes conscious assertion of White House power to coordinate them (Sylves 2014) .
As with DHS, the role of the NSC is less clearly defined in public health incidents than in other kinds of emergencies.
Suasion and executive action
In such a diverse system, formal, hierarchical, governance is not the rule. The result is that much of the response to public health events such as Ebola is a mixture of suasion and executive action.
Suasion, in the United States and elsewhere, is a way to overcome fragmented governance arrangements by using non--hierarchical means such as offering assistance, writing guidelines, and financing networks of professionals. It compensates for the lack of top--down hierarchical governance in the US by diffusing agreements on how to work. It also often empowers the federal government, which, thanks to CDC, is rich in the kinds of resources and networks that are effective in suasion. For example, once the CDC released their recommendations for appropriate infection control procedures related to Ebola, it became the near--automatic resource for hospital administrators as they contemplated the threat of disease and their organizational response. CDC guidelines, even the ones without binding authority such as recommendations for disease management, enjoy a legitimacy that other guidelines do not. Finally, those resources, such as CDC laboratories and experts, and its emergency management personnel, can assist local actors. In general, state and local authorities and health systems are highly responsive to CDC and will rarely contest its technical advice. In turn, if CDC advice is slow, changeable or contested, as it was during the Ebola outbreak, its effectiveness might rapidly diminish.
Unsurprisingly, in such a fragmented system, executives such as governors and the President have a major role when they want (Hess and Pfiffner 2012) . The
Federalist Papers, written by authors of the U.S. Constitution, accurately noted that there is always "energy in the executive" which tends to empower executives over time and in crises (Federalist 70). As in most political systems (Savoie 2010) , the normal interagency coordination bureaucracy is slow and prone to failure, and so the executive develops techniques to act decisively, and force compliance, when the President really wants action. Likewise, in the states, governors and their offices tend to coordinate within their state governments and take decisive action.
Executives, who are publicly visible and whom voters often hold accountable for conditions in their jurisdictions have both the opportunity to take on leading roles and the incentive to do so. Governors with ambition towards higher office can have extra incentive to provide visible leadership. 1 They might seek out conflict with the federal government, for example.
The result is an American pattern of executive energy within individual governments, directed by highly visible executives, and suasion based on authoritative knowledge. Executives can provide coordination and leadership, but also introduce conflict when they disagree and can have political incentive to accentuate their disagreements. Suasion is powerful when authoritative knowledge is sought and valued, e.g. by health care providers unaccustomed to facing Ebola.
Mixtures of authoritative expertise such as that of CDC, which enables suasion, and hierarchical authority, found in executives, drive U.S. public health responses.
II. Suasion and executive energy in Ebola response
The Within this fragmented and individualized system of care, it is unsurprising that two THPH nurses, Nina Pham and Amber Joy Vinson, were exposed to Ebola. A later report commissioned by Texas Health Resources concluded that "CDC and others were learning alongside the actual providers… it appears that there was a lack of effective and efficient collaboration prior to the event… The roles and responsibilities of all parties were not clearly outlined in advance" (Cortese et al. 2015 October 31 a Maine judge overturned the quarantine order.
Federal response
Like the governors, the President came under pressure to take visible action. Obama publicly intervened in the federal response with the appointment on October 17 th , a bit less than two weeks before the upcoming midterm elections, of Ron Klain, a former chief of staff to Vice--Presidents Albert Gore and Joe Biden (Eilperin 2014 
III. Media, elite cues, and Ebola
The policy decisions of, and conflicts between, political leaders already highlighted the importance of these elected politicians in a polarized political system. The media frame within which their actions were reported was also often shaped by partisan politics.
Public opinion researchers find that even politically engaged citizens organize their policy views to fit with "cues" from elites who share their partisanship. In this model, politically engaged citizens have coherent opinions because they take cues from political elites (Zaller 1992 (Feldman et al. 2012 , Prior 2013 . Fox News, in particular, seems to have a big effect on conservative and Republican agendas and views (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, Grossman and Hopkins 2016) .
To examine whether the news media for traditionally conservative outlets were more likely to cover the Ebola outbreak, we searched television transcripts Republican elites' cueing behaviour could be expected to explain the partisan disparity in views about Ebola. It became a "Republican" issue, critical of President
Obama. An analysis of a much larger corpus of U.S print publications echoes these what they can do through our porous border. It's so critically important to really use every tool, shut off every mechanism, for them and that disease and other potential diseases to come into our country" (Bradner 2014a ). Representative Louie Gohmert, a Texas Republican, lampooned liberals when he said of border controls that "countries that recognize that they have an obligation to protect their people regardless of whether or not it's politically correct have done just that…We used to have quarantines of serious diseases that would kill people. But this day in time, gee, we don't want anybody to feel like they're being left out" (Bradner 2014a ). Beyond individual statements, there was an October spike in Republican campaign advertising calling the handling of Ebola a failure, for which Democratic politicians deserved blame, or showing images evoking public health threats such as people in haz--mat suits (Talev 2014) .
IV. Ebola, partisanship, and blame in the 2014 elections
Ebola crystallized pre--existing partisanship, which was peaking immediately before November 2014 elections. Unsurprisingly, public opinion about Ebola was substantially predicted, and cued, by partisan beliefs.
Blame attribution and partisanship
The president's political party almost always suffers electoral defeat during midterm elections. Over the past seventy years, the political party of the president has on average lost nearly thirty combined seats in the House and Senate during a midterm election (Peters 2014) . There are several reasons why the president's political party suffers electoral defeats in midterm elections, with two standing out:
blame attribution and partisan cueing. Both suggest that an issue such as Ebola would turn into an opportunity for the opposition to the incumbent president to blame the president for presumed incompetence, which is exactly what happened.
The president is the most visible politician in the country and this visibility is a two--edged sword politically for the president's political party. It provides opportunity for policy advocacy and agenda shaping but it also inspires blame assignment by opposing partisans. During the midterm election season, opposition parties are able to campaign against presidential policy stances, controversies, and other events in their bid to gain more legislative seats.
Party cues have been shown to be an important explanation of the development and shaping of policy preferences and have led to blame attribution.
Individuals who identify themselves with a political party alter their own policy views to correspond with their identified political party (Miller and Shanks 1996) .
Party cues influence how voters view and blame politicians in the wake of government failure; voters with a stable party identification are more likely to blame officials of the opposite party (Malhotra and Kuo 2008) . The party that does not hold the White House will try to maximize its legislative power by highlighting failures of government performance and attributing them to the president's party (Lee 2009 ).
Salience of Ebola Outbreak
As the United States had its first experiences with Ebola, polling firms began tracking respondents' level of interest in the story. More than one--third of respondents reported that Ebola was a very important issue related to their vote for the midterm election (Preston 2014) . At the end of July, the Pew Research Center found that respondents were just as likely to have very closely or fairly closely followed the Ebola outbreak as those respondents who did not follow the story at all. As the weeks progressed a marked shift occurred amongst Pew respondents.
Throughout August and September 2014, the proportion of poll respondents who reported that they were following the Ebola outbreak "Very Closely" or "Fairly
Closely" increased, while the percentage of respondents who did not follow the story decreased (Pew Research Center 2014) . This trend continued through the end of October, while news reported actions such as the decision of a Texas community college to reject three Nigerian students on the grounds that they might carry Ebola (Jaschik 2014) . The salience of the Ebola outbreak amongst the public was such that by the end of October, the Pew Research Center declared that the story was one of the most--followed events for the American public since 2010 (Motel 2014) . Popular Evidence that concern with Ebola was electorally driven includes the sharp decline in the number of respondents who followed the Ebola outbreak as soon as the election was past. Domestic Ebola events were still occurring, with the spread of the disease to New York City and the death of a Sierra Leonean physician in Nebraska occurring after the midterm elections, but the salience of the issue dropped sharply, along with media coverage.
Politicization of the Ebola Outbreak and Response
Public opinion surveys show both a high and highly politicized public view of Ebola 
V. Conclusion
The United States' response to Ebola was neither command--and--control nor consensual, but rather a mixture of executive action, suasion, and political argument. We highlighted three themes, which help explain the response to Ebola in the United States. First, its fragmented health care system meant that the responses to the threat of Ebola on the ground would be highly variable, depending substantially on the particular health care organization and its infection control, Similarly, our analysis also points to overconfidence in the idea that health care systems around the US were up to the task of managing Ebola whenever and wherever it occurred. Health providers in the United States lacked preparation and skill to effectively handle Ebola patients. Over the course of the Ebola outbreak, a small handful of infectious disease 'magnet' hospitals handled all but two patients: New York City, a major centre for infectious disease for centuries, treated one patient successfully). There are a variety of reasons why people might advocate for the capacity to handle Ebola and similar diseases in every tertiary hospital, not least the impressive boost to expenditure on staff and equipment it would entail and the potential brand visibility of successfully handling cases. There was a much better case for communications to stress that an Ebola patient should be stabilized and transferred to a more appropriate clinical site as quickly as possible. In a fragmented system with no good way for public health officials to direct health care decisions, though, there is a high chance that ambitious tertiary care hospitals build their own capacity to manage highly infectious diseases. More capacity might be helpful (Klain 2016 ) but it will likely be unplanned and we will learn of its effectiveness in the next outbreak.
The Ebola experience is also suggestive with regard to the organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy. Even if the strongest, and probably only powerful form of coordination in the federal government is the intervention of the President, the Ebola experience suggests that the U.S. federal bureaucracy could be more amenable to coordination in public health emergencies. Both expertise and formal coordination for public health emergencies are spread across the CDC, HHS, the DHS, and the NSC. The latter two have little public health expertise, and it is not clear that framing public health emergencies as security issues or tasking emergency management bureaucracies with handling them produces better public health policy. Klain's own reflections on Ebola focused on how the lack of clear responsibilities dissipated public health expertise and slowed response. He called for a permanent public health emergency office on the grounds that there should be no need for a future czar for each disease (Klain 2016) .
Finally, regardless of organizational issues, our analysis points to the importance of expertise, which underpins CDC's powers of suasion in a fragmented system with multiple incentives who have incentives to act. Authoritative knowledge, which CDC is usually presumed to have, is a powerful force to inform, standardize behaviour, and formulate appropriate responses. That means, of course, that CDC must be sure its knowledge is perceived to be authoritative--partly a challenge for its own scientific credibility in the eyes of public health practitioners, but also a challenge given partisan polarization of public views about any executive agency.
Our working title for this article was "Ebola in the United States: Well, what did you expect?" Public health policy that depends on suasion such as CDC guidelines, addressed to governments and providers alike, might frustrate those who believe that there is a one best way and want a hierarchical organization to do it. Likewise, energetic action by executives with whom one disagrees can be frustrating (though federalism at least quarantines bad policy in one jurisdiction).
Partisan media and public opinion can create or misdirect blame even when the system works well, and can make policy more difficult. Nonetheless, fragmentation, reliance on suasion and executive action to make policy, and an oppositional political system that finds fault for political reasons are at the core of American public health policymaking. We should not expect a different story in the next public health crisis.
